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Abstract
As SARS-Cov 2 spreads worldwide, governments struggle to keep people safe without collapsing
the economy. Social distancing and quarantines have proven to be effective measures to save lives,
yet their impact on the economy is becoming apparent. The major challenge faced by many coun-
tries at this point of the pandemic, is to find a way to keep their critical industries such as health,
telecommunications, national security, transportation, food and energy functioning while having
a safe environment for their workers. In this paper we propose a novel approach based on peri-
odic SARS-CoV 2 antibody testing to reduce the risk of contagious within the working space, and
evaluate it using stochastic simulations of the health evolution of the workforce. Our simulations
indicate that the proper use of testing and quarantine of workers suspected of being infected can
greatly reduce the number of infections while improving the productivity of the company in the
long run.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As SARS-Cov 2 spreads worldwide, governments struggle to keep people safe without collapsing the
economy. Social distancing and quarantines have proven to be effective measures to save lives, yet
their impact on the economy is becoming apparent. The major challenge faced by many coun-
tries at this point of the pandemic, is to find a way to keep their critical industries such as health,
telecommunications, national security, transportation, food and energy functioning while having
a safe environment for their workers. In this paper we propose a novel approach based on peri-
odic SARS-CoV 2 antibody testing to reduce the risk of contagious within the working space, and
evaluate it using stochastic simulations of the health evolution of the workforce.
Our approach assumes firms use antibody tests to screen workers because this is the best avail-
able option. The gold standard for diagnosis of SARS-CoV 2 is the RT-PCR, which is expensive,
requires laboratories and is scarce in most countries. There also exist antigen test that require a
nasopharyngeal swab, just like PCR. These tests exist in point-of-care modality, where they have
shown poor results, and also in-laboratory modality, with better outcomes. Yet the latter cannot
be applied at the workplace, which makes them unattractive for most firms. If there existed a good
antigen rapid test that could be applied at point-of-care we would use it, but none has succeeded so
far. The antibody rapid test we consider requires a simple finger prick blood sample to obtain a re-
sult in 10-15 minutes. These tests can be taken at the work place and have high specificity (95%) and
an acceptable sensitivity (93%) after 7 days of symptoms onset [15]. Antibody tests detect the pres-
ence of specific anti SARS-CoV 2 antibodies, which reflect concurrent or previous viral infection.
There are some that already have FDA and/or its equivalent European (CE) fast-track approval.
We propose to apply these tests to the asymptomatic working population assuming antibody re-
sponses similar to those described for symptomatic patients, as some authors have seen that serum
antibody levels do not correlate with clinical severity [17]. By applying this model we intend to de-
tect as early as possible an asymptomatic worker that could be shedding the virus without know-
ing. Detecting and isolating him/her will prevent future spreading of the virus from this patient.
Furthermore, doing so let us identify his/her close contacts and put them into quarantine as well,
preventing, ideally, further spreading the disease.
As mentioned above, the test we use is not a diagnostic test, so a person that comes up positive
should be confirmed with PCR, if PCR were not available we recommend considering the person
as COVID-19 positive. There has been an increasing concern regarding sanitary measures when a
worker has been identified positive for the virus that could lead to closing a factory. We believe that
a responsible management strategy applying safety measures, like the one we propose and study
in this paper, would justify that the sanitary authority react less harshly when positive cases are
detected.
Finally we would like to emphasize that this is a tool to be added to other recommendations to
avoid the virus spreading at work, such as social distancing, personal protective elements, home-
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office, shifts, no casino lunches and sanitation among others.
2 MATHEMATICALMODEL
In this section we describe what is known about the disease in terms of incubation, symptom, and
shedding periods, which is crucial for the disease evolution. We also focus on the contagiousness of
the virus and the production of antibodies that can be detected to isolate a potentially contagious
patient. Then, we describe the relevant parameters and random variables and the protocols that are
considered for the evaluation of the use of antibody tests and shifts to reduce the risk of contagious
within an organization. Finally, we describe the Montecarlo simulation model and compare it with
the well known SIR and SEIR epidemiological models.
2.1 Evolution of the disease: description and assumptions
Our data on the time line of viral behavior for asymptomatic patients is extrapolated from what the
literature describes as mild cases, given that there is insufficient data for asymptomatic patients and
some authors have demonstrated similar characteristics between both types of individuals. [23].
Because it is not known when the person becomes infected, it is assumed that a patient be-
comes contagious two days before showing symptoms [2], [7]. We also assume that the time until
the symptoms show up, given that the sick person will show up with symptoms, is distributed ac-
cording to a lognormal distribution [10]. The data suggests that mild cases experience a duration of
symptoms of 7-14 days [2].
The viral shedding period, i.e., the period when the infected person is contagious, starts approx-
imately 2 days before the onset of symptoms [2], [7] and ends between 10 to 14 days after symptoms
subside [2]. The study in [23] finds that an infected person has a higher viral load within the first 5
days since symptoms onset, and hypothesizes that this could lead to a higher contagious rate. How-
ever, there is no high quality evidence so far that confirms this hypothesis. Therefore, we assume a
homogeneous contagious rate over time [20], [21].
Additionally, we assume that asymptomatic infected individuals do not get complications from
the infection, and therefore do not die as a consequence of the virus. That is, they recover sponta-
neously and we do not know who has done it.
Currently, the quarantine in place in Chile works as follows: if a person shows symptoms and the
infection is confirmed by a PCR test, she is quarantined immediately until symptoms subside, and
for an additional period of 14 days [12], [14]. We also consider that an asymptomatic person without
a previous history of COVID-19 with a positive antibody test – either for IgM or IgG –2 is potentially
2IgM e IgG are immunoglobulins that form part of our immune response against different microorganism. They are
two of the various known antibodies that humans produce. IgM is usually associated to the acute phase of an infection,
whilst IgG can be seen during the acute phase and posterior to it, lasting longer in our system. It may prevent future rein-
fection or prepare for a better immune response in case of reinfection. Antibody rapid tests are specific for the detection
of anti-SARS-CoV 2 antibodies.
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an infectious agent, and therefore is quarantined for 14 days. If during this period, he/she presents
symptoms, the quarantine is extended for another 14 days from the time the symptoms subside.
If mild symptoms develop, they last randomly in a range from 5 to 10 days [2]. In both cases, the
person at the end of the quarantine is considered recovered, and thus, not contagious.
The WHO-China Joint Mission Report, [2] found that 81% of the infected population presents
mild symptoms, while other authors have found that this percentage is 61% for mild cases [13]. An
article from the Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team, [6] estimated that only 2/3 of the in-
fected present recognizable symptoms. Additionally, another study on pregnant women showed
that 80% might carry the virus without symptoms [16]. In a long-term care facility in the United
States, 56% of those who tested positive with PCR were asymptomatic [9]. Thus, combining cur-
rent available information, we assume that 50% of the infected population will develop the disease
in a oligoasymptomatic fashion. We chose not to consider higher incidence as found for specific-
population studies (e.g., pregnant or long-term care facility) or suggested by recent antibody testing
on random populations, as this might lead to over estimation. Identifying these groups is key for
pandemic control because asymptomatic patients and patients with very mild COVID-19 symp-
toms may not seek health care, nor receive diagnosis, which leads to underestimation of the bur-
den of COVID-19. We note that the oligoasymptomatic might shed the virus just as symptomatic
patients [23], [5].
The model’s aim is to ensure a safe work environment, we therefore develop an algorithm for the
interpretation of the test results that misses the least active viral shedding workers despite the possi-
bility of quarentaining a non-shedding worker until he gets his PCR done. Given the low prevalence
of confirmed SARS-CoV 2 to date in Chile, and that the first reported case was less than two months
ago, we decided to interpret the antibody results for asymptomatic-under screening population as
follows:
Notice that the interpretation of the antibodies’ results that is explained above for the oligoasymp-
tomatics under screening population differs from the interpretation done in cases of known COVID-
19 patients who afterwards get tested with antibodies. We remark that the latter are not the subject
of this study. Regarding those who came in contact with the virus and after some time get tested
with antibodies and show IgM (-) and IgG (+), to date there is insufficient evidence to confirm their
immunity, nonetheless there are some studies that suggest that reinfection is unlikely [1], [4]. Thus,
in the near future, when more knowledge is acquired, the data gathered from screening will provide
valuable information for public health policy.
3
IgM IgG Interpretation Viral shedding asm.
− − Still has not come in contact with virus No*
or is in antibody window period.
+ − Acute phase of infection Yes
+ + Acute phase of infection Yes
− + Acute phase of infection** Yes
*We know that a negative antibody test does not rule out viral shedding, but the only way to confirm that
would be by PCR testing (or a good antigen test) and that is not currently available. Therefore, we inter-
pret this result as the equivalent of having citizens going to work without screening, assuming they are not
spreading the virus.
** We decided to interpret this result as active infection to increase our sensitivity despite losing specificity,
but ensuring a safer return to work. This is under the consideration that: i ) we are testing asymptomatic
patient that have no previous history of COVID-19, i i ) many will have previous antibody tests to compare
(because we are testing twice a week), i i i ) the probability of having contact with a COVID-19 positive person
is still low in Chile (at least for non-health worker), i v) negative IgM could be a false negative (this range
between 5-15%), and v) It would take approximately one month for a person infected by SARS-CoV2 to se-
roconvert from antibody negative to IgM (+) / IgG (+), and then to IgM (-) / IgG (+), and given that the first
COVID-19 case in Chile was less than 2 month ago, we considered this unlikely.
2.2 Parameters
• R0 = Basic reproduction number (expected number of cases directly generated by one case in
a population where all individuals are susceptible to infection). This number is estimated at
the beginning of the pandemic and is a function ofR0= τcE(Ip ) where τ is the transmissibility
(i.e., probability of infection given contact between a susceptible and infected individual), c
is the average rate of contact between susceptible and infected individuals, and E(Ip ) is the
duration of infectiousness [8]. Several estimates have been reported in the literature [18], [22].
• R0(w) = Basic reproduction number within the organization or company. With strict mea-
sures, this number can be reduced considerably .
• Pr(IgM+ or IgG+|Infected) = sensitivity of combined antibody test. It varies as follows: from 1
to 7 days since symptoms onset equal to 11%, between days [8,14] equal to 92,9% and 96.8%
after 14 days [15].
• Pr(IgM− and IgG−|Susceptible) = specificity of the test.
• ps = Pr(sint) = Probability of becoming symptomatic, given that the person got the virus.
• Pr(S) = probability of being susceptible (not infected yet) at the beginning of the planning
horizon.
• Pr(E) = probability of being exposed and not contagious at the beginning of the planning
horizon.
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• Pr(I ) = probability of being sick and contagious at the beginning of the planning horizon.
• Pr(R) = probability of being sick and recovered at the beginning of the planning horizon . Note
that Pr(S)+Pr(E)+Pr(I )+Pr(R)= 1.
• Sh = number of hours in a shift.
2.3 Random variables
• os = time until symptoms show up, given that the person will be symptomatic.
• Ip= Viral shedding period.
• ds = Duration of symptoms.
• NS(t ) = number of workers that are susceptible at day t .
• NE (t ) = number of workers that are exposed at day t .
• NI (t ) = number of workers that are infected and contagious at day t .
• NR (t ) = number of workers that have recovered from the virus at day t .
• WS(t ) = number of workers that are susceptible and working at day t .
• WE (t ) = number of workers that are exposed and working at day t .
• WI (t ) = number of workers that are infected, contagious, and working at day t .
• WR (t ) = number of recovered workers, working at day t .
• W (t )=WS(t )+WE (t )+WI (t )+WR (t ) = Total number of workers working at dat t .
• Npop(t ) = number of total people in the total population of interest.
• NpopS(t ) = number of susceptible people in the total population of interest.
• Npop I (t ) = number of infected people in the total population of interest.
Therefore, we estimate the daily probability of getting infected at day t (pc (t ))as follows:
pc (t )= R0(w)E(Ip )
WI (t )
W (t )
(Sh/16)+
R0
E(Ip )
Npop I (t )
Npop(t )
((16−Sh)/16)
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2.4 Protocols
Our analysis compares the following protocols:
1. Protocol 0 (No Protocol): This is the baseline protocol, where only workers that show up
symtoms are quarantined. They return to work 14 days after symptoms subside.
2. Protocol 0(shut down): This protocol is similar to Protocol 0, except that in the case of a
symptomatic worker, the company is closed for 14 days. All workers return to work after the
quarantine, except for those who show symptoms, who stay 14 extra days, after symptoms
subside. This protocol has been used in some companies in Chile by the Regional Health
Authority (Seremi de Salud). As a result, many companies are currently operatiing with great
uncertainty.
3. Protocol ABTk: This protocol includes antibody tests every k days for all its workers. If the
test is positive for either I gM or I gG , the worker is quarantined for 14 days unless he shows
symptoms at some point. In the latter case he stays 14 extra days, after symptoms subside.
4. Protocol Shift14: This protocol considers two shifts of 14 days each. If a worker is infected
and symptomatic, then the regular quarantine applies for him.
5. Protocol Shift14+ABTk: This protocol is the combination of shifts of 14 days and the use of
antibody tests for workers that are in an active shift.
2.5 Algorithm for Simulations of Protocols
The flowchart diagrams below in Figures 1 and 2 describe the logic of the simulations developed
to evaluate the protocols designed to reduce the risk of infection and closure of plants when going
back to work. First, we introduce some additional notation. Let N be the total number of individuals
at the beginning of the simulation (i.e., working population size) and T the planning horizon under
study. To ease notation, we will assume that all random variables described in the previous section
can be grouped in one joint distribution D – although most of them are independent. To be more
precise, the random variables we are considering are the following:
• Proportion of initial population at each compartment.
• Days until symptom onset and duration of symptoms.
• Duration of infection after symptoms vanish.
• Transition probability from susceptible to exposed given number of infected workers.
• Antibody presence in serological test.
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For each individual i = 1, . . . ,N , denote by c ti ∈ {S,E , I ,R} his health state at time t , cˆ ti ∈ {S,E , I ,R}
his observed state at time t (for example, the decision maker might believe the worker is susceptible
although in reality he is incubating the disease), and ati ∈ {W,Q} the working state at time t (work or
quarantine). For Protocol Shift14, we classify workers at home for 14 days as quarantined.
We encode a protocol by two functions ϕ and ψ. The first one, ψ decides the observed state of
an individual based on any indication of illness the protocol is allowed to measure – e.g. symptoms
for Protocols 0, serological test and symptoms for the rest. Note that given the stochastic nature of
this indicators, the functionψ takes as argument the vector of previous observed states, the current
activity of each individual, and a random state drawn from D given the actual health state and
activities. The second function, ϕ, decides whether the individual is allowed to work or must go
into quarantine. It takes as input the vector of observed states and the activities.
In each iteration, nature draws from D the new health state of the population given the history
of health states up to that point, and the activity of each worker. The distribution of workers in quar-
antine or work is relevant since it determines which workers can get infected by whom. Then, the
protocol takes as input the current activities and the history of observed states, along with hyper–
parameters such as duration of quarantine and frequency of serological testing if applies, and uses
the decision rules described above to updates the activity of each individual.
After T iterations the algorithm stops and outputs the full history of states and activities for
every individual. Specifically, let Sit = (c it , cˆ it ,ait ) be the vector describing a worker i , then St = (Sit |
i = 1, . . .N ) and the algorithm outputs (St | 0≤ t ≤ T ).
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start
User Input:
Generate Initial Population:
Protocol
Environment updates states according to 
previous states, activities and transition
distribution:
Output:
end
FALSE
TRUE
Global\Environment  Input: 
Protocol Input:
Figure 1: Flowchart of the algorithm.
2.6 Relationship between Simulations and SIR and SEIRModels
In this subsection, we study the relationship between our modeling of the disease spreading in a
contained population compared to the results obtained from the well known SIR and SEIR models.
In what follows, we briefly describe these models and find the equivalency between the parameters
described above and those used in the SIR/SEIR models.
SIR model is described by the following three differential equations [19]:
dS
dt
= −βIS
N
,
dI
dt
= βIS
N
−γI ,
dR
dt
= γI ,
where S is the stock of the susceptible population, I the stock of infected individuals, R the stock
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Protocol
start
Protocol Input:
Analyze according to observed states and 
activity and apply serological test if 
applicable.
Update observed states:
Take decision based on 
observed states and activities
Update activities:
end
State Input:
Figure 2: Flowchart of the Protocol.
of recovered population and N the entire population. [The model assumes the fraction of the pop-
ulation that dies is small and therefore can be ignored.] Additionally, R0 = βγ and 1γ is the average
time until recovery. Therefore, we can solve the SIR model using the parameters of our model by
calculating γ= 1E(Cp ) and β=R0
1
E(Cp )
.
Studies show however that the incubation period of the disease can be significant [3], [10], [11].
To account for this, we consider the extended version of the previous model known as SEIR, where
an extra compartment of exposed (E) individuals is added between susceptible and infectious states.
Exposed individuals are already infected with the disease, but have not yet started to infect the
susceptible population. Assuming the incubation period is a exponential random variable3 with
mean α−1, the set of differential equations that model the evolution of the disease can be stated as
3In our simulation, this is not the case, as the incubation period is a lognormal random variable of mean E(ts )−2.
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follows4:
dS
dt
= −βIS
N
,
dE
dt
= βIS
N
−αE
dI
dt
= αE −γI ,
dR
dt
= γI .
Under the assumptions we stated, the incubation period lasts until 2 days before symptoms start to
develop. Thus, we have α = 1E(ts )−2 . Using this combination of parameters α, β and γ, we can find
the trajectories in the SEIR model. The graphical solution is displayed in Figure 3 along with the
solution obtained using our scheme.
Note that the SIR and SEIR models do not factor any type of measure to control the disease.
In the simulations displayed in the results section, the evolution of the disease was affected by ac-
tions that helped prevent or diminish the spread. The plots in Figure 3 show the mean trajectory of
the number of susceptible, exposed, infected and recover individuals according to our model if no
measure was taken.
3 Data
In waht follows we describe the data used in Section 4
4 Results
In this section we describe the evolution of the disease obtained through simulations with different
protocols. To summarize the discussion, we measure the performance of each protocol using met-
rics that are relevant to the objective of having safe working spaces. In general, we are interested in
the health conditions of the workers, and the monetary costs of implementing a protocol (e.g., cost
and number of total of serological tests). See section 6 of Appendix of Figures.
The main results can be summarized as follows:
• ABT diminishes the number of infected individuals by x% with respect to the baseline, with-
out significantly impact the number of active workers.
• Shift and Shift + ABT are the safest ones, but the number of active workers is reduced to half.
• Evidently, ABT1 is the safest among ABT , but it also diminishes the number of workers the
most, and is the most expensive to implement.
4We ignore vital dynamics to simplify the model and because they do not play a significant role in the applications we
are considering.
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Parameter Value
R0 1.6
R0(w) 3
S 1−7d = 11%,8−14d = 93%,≥ 15d = 97%(*)
E 0.97
ps 0.5
Pr(S) 0.983
Pr(I ) 0.017
Pr(R) 0.00
Sh (hrs) 8
0s (days) lnN (µ= 5.1,σ2 = 1.8) (**)
ds U [7,10] (***)
Ip 2+ds +U [5,10]
(*) See reference [15].
(**) See references [3], [10], and [11].
(***) [2] reports a median time from onset to clinical recovery for mild cases of approximately 2 weeks. Thus,
we adjusted this time to 7-10 days because we consider oligoasymptomatic patients.
• Shut down diminishes the number of active workers substantially, but it’s the less effective
protocol in terms of infection propagation.
4.1 Sensitivity Analysis
We examine how sensitive are our recommendations to changes in two of the parameters we con-
sider. Namely, we will simulate the ABT3 protocol under different values for the sensitivity of the
test, and the duration of the post-symptom infection. We vary the former between 0 and 1, whereas
the latter takes the value of a uniform random value whose mean and length of interval are changed.
Table of results in the appendix.
5 Applications
Currently we are in the process of applying some combinations of the protocols described above
with specific firms and government agencies. We will report these cases when they are imple-
mented and results can be observed.
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6 Appendix of Figures
6.1 SEIRModel
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Figure 3: Comparison between our agent based simulation and the solution of the SEIR aggregate
system. We used α= 1/3, γ= 1/22.5, R0 = 2, I (0)= 0.01 and β= γR0.
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Figure 4: Evolution of SEIR model with α= 1/3, γ= 1/22.5, R0 = 2, I (0)= 0.01 and β= γR0.
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Figure 5: Simulation of evolution of infection using our simulation approach with α = 1/3, γ =
1/22.5, R0 = 2, I (0)= 0.01 and β= γR0.
6.2 Results
15
120 150
60 90
0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0%
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Infected as a Percentage of Individuals at Work
Cu
m
u
la
tiv
e
 D
en
si
ty
 F
un
ct
io
n
No Protocol
Shut Down
Shift 14
ABT 3
Figure 6: Cumulative distribution of number of infected workers at work on different times (2, 3, 4
and 5 months). R0 = 1.6, R0(w)= 3 and initial prevalence = 0.75%.
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis
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Protocol stat 60 90 120 150
ABT3 Mean 0.29% 0.29% 0.27% 0.26%
SD 6.98e-03 6.81e-03 6.85e-03 6.38e-03
No Protocol Mean 1.50% 1.62% 1.55% 1.40%
SD 2.37e-02 2.47e-02 2.3e-02 2.17e-02
Shift14 Mean 0.46% 0.45% 0.45% 0.46%
SD 1.13e-02 1.14e-02 1.17e-02 1.25e-02
Shut Down Mean 0.36% 0.35% 0.35% 0.34%
SD 8.5e-03 8.28e-03 8.42e-03 8.29e-03
Table 1: Mean and Standard Deviation of percentage of infected workers at work as a fraction of
total workers at work for different protocols. R0 = 1.6, R0(w)= 3 and initial prevalence = 0.75%.
Protocol stat 60 90 120 150
ABT3 Mean 3.68% 4.92% 6.10% 7.25%
SD 3.68 4.35 4.84 5.27
No Protocol Mean 6.92% 10.78% 14.52% 17.87%
SD 7.98 11.43 13.89 15.39
Shift14 Mean 3.21% 4.34% 5.44% 6.51%
SD 3.05 3.69 4.19 4.60
Shut Down Mean 3.67% 4.97% 6.26% 7.53%
SD 3.15 3.79 4.32 4.74
Table 2: Mean and Standard Deviation of cumulative number of infections as a percentage of the
total population for different protocols. 100 Workers. R0 = 1.6, R0(w) = 3 and initial prevalence =
0.75%.
Protocolo Total_Infected Working
Shift14 6.7% 50%
ABT3 7.4% 99%
Shut Down 7.8% 77%
No Protocol 18.5% 99%
Table 3: Total infected, and mean number of workers per day. 100 Workers. R0 = 1.6, R0(w)= 3 and
initial prevalence = 0.75%.
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Figure 7: Probability density function of total number of infected workers at different times (2, 3, 4
and 5 months). R0 = 1.6, R0(w)= 3 and initial prevalence = 0.75%.
Iterations ABT 3 No Protocol Shift 14 Shut Down
1000 4.24% 3.74% 4.66% 5.28%
2000 3.06% 2.65% 3.23% 3.62%
3000 2.50% 2.17% 2.63% 2.96%
4000 2.20% 1.88% 2.29% 2.53%
5000 1.99% 1.68% 2.05% 2.26%
6000 1.81% 1.53% 1.87% 2.08%
7000 1.68% 1.42% 1.73% 1.92%
8000 1.57% 1.33% 1.62% 1.80%
9000 1.48% 1.25% 1.52% 1.70%
10000 1.40% 1.19% 1.44% 1.61%
Table 4: Coefficient of Variation of the mean number of infected workers as the number of iterations
increases. 100 Workers. R0 = 1.6, R0(w)= 3 and initial prevalence = 0.75%.
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Figure 8: Percentage of infected workers across time. R0 = 1.6, R0(w) = 3 and initial prevalence =
0.75%.
Sensitivity Total Infected Infected
Working
Days
Fraction of Days
without Infected
Workers
Mean Workers
0.00 10.13 88.16 0.67 97.70
0.20 9.33 74.50 0.70 98.20
0.40 8.59 63.20 0.73 98.79
0.60 7.85 53.96 0.76 98.54
0.80 7.66 50.49 0.77 98.54
0.95 7.26 46.41 0.78 98.21
0.97 7.25 46.15 0.78 98.29
1.00 7.26 46.12 0.78 98.54
Table 5: Summary of results for protocol ABT3 with different values of test sensitivity. In bold the
default scenario. 100 Workers, 156 days. R0 = 1.6, R0(w)= 3 and initial prevalence = 0.75%.
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Figure 9: Infected working days. R0 = 1.6, R0(w)= 3 and initial prevalence = 0.75%.
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Figure 10: Fraction of days with at least one worker infected at work. R0 = 1.6, R0(w)= 3 and initial
prevalence = 0.75%.
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Figure 11: Mean number of days since infection to quarantine. R0 = 1.6, R0(w)= 3 and initial preva-
lence = 0.75%.
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Post-
symptom
Infectious
Period
Protocol Total
Infected
Workers
Infected
Man–Days
Percentage of
Days without
Infected Workers
Daily
Avg.
Number
of
Workers
U [0,1] ABT3 6.49 36.43 82 98.46
No Protocol 9.66 80.13 69 99.31
U [1,3] ABT3 6.93 40.41 81 98.52
No Protocol 11.37 103.99 64 98.75
U [3,5] ABT3 7.01 42.19 80 98.01
No Protocol 13.65 138.17 57 98.34
U [3,7] ABT3 7.20 44.17 79 98.09
No Protocol 14.51 153.75 55 98.01
U [5,7] ABT3 7.28 45.54 79 98.08
No Protocol 15.88 175.75 53 98.45
U[5,10] ABT3 7.25 46.15 78 98.29
No Protocol 18.57 218.57 47 99.12
U [7,10] ABT3 7.41 47.88 77 99.22
No Protocol 20.25 247.99 43 99.59
U [7,14] ABT3 7.80 53.20 75 97.57
No Protocol 24.18 321.07 34 98.43
Table 6: Summary of results for protocol ABT3 and No Protocol with different values of post-
symptom infection time. In bold the default scenario. 100 Workers, 156 days. R0 = 1.6, R0(w) = 3
and initial prevalence = 0.75%.
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